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HOW  AGENCIES  CHOOSE  WHETHER  TO  ENFORCE
THE  LAW:  A  PRELIMINARY  INVESTIGATION
Aaron L. Nielson*
One of the most controversial aspects of administrative law in recent years concerns agency
decisions not to enforce the law.  Such nonenforcement is often beneficial or, in any event, inevi-
table.  A particular violation may be so distant from what Congress or the agency had in mind
when the general prohibition was put on the books that enforcement makes little sense.  Likewise,
because agencies have finite resources, they cannot enforce the law in all situations.  At the same
time, however, nonenforcement can also raise difficult questions about basic notions of fairness
and administrative regularity, as well as separation of powers concerns.  Nonenforcement deci-
sions can be particularly significant, moreover, because they often are not subject to judicial
review.  Despite the importance of the topic, however, little empirical work has been done on the
processes agencies use to evaluate potential nonenforcement.
This Article has three purposes.  First, drawing on interviews and survey data, it offers a
preliminary real-world look into how a number of agencies choose whether to enforce the law in
the context of waivers, exemptions, and prosecutorial discretion.  The evidence suggests that non-
enforcement is heterogeneous across numerous dimensions—including who is involved in the
process, the steps the agency must take to make a nonenforcement decision, the scope of nonen-
forcement, and the potential for public and judicial scrutiny of the agency’s decision.  Second,
this Article begins to sketch a taxonomy of nonenforcement.  Although nonenforcement is often
treated as a unitary concept, in fact it comes in many flavors, some of which are more dangerous
than others.  Finally, building on this taxonomy, this Article urges safeguards to prevent nonen-
forcement’s abuse.  Most significantly, nonenforcement should be rare and requests for it should
serve as a signal that retrospective review may be in order.
© 2018 Aaron L. Nielson.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court recently did a remarkable thing.  In 2016, the
Court granted certiorari to review whether the “Deferred Action for Parents
of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents” executive action—DAPA for
short—should be enjoined as unlawful.  Through this program, the Obama
administration purported to use enforcement “discretion to permit an alien
to be ‘lawfully present,’” so long as certain conditions were satisfied.1  The
Supreme Court’s decision to hear the case was not remarkable; once the
Fifth Circuit upheld an injunction of DAPA,2 nearly everyone expected the
Court to hear the case.
What was remarkable, however, was the Court’s sua sponte instruction
that the parties also brief “[w]hether the Guidance violates the Take Care
Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 3.”3  That command turned what was
already a contentious dispute about immigration in particular and adminis-
trative law in general into an all-out constitutional battle.  Anticlimactically,
however, the Court later announced that because the Justices were split four
to four, the Fifth Circuit’s decision would be affirmed without opinion by an
equally divided court.4  The Court therefore did not resolve the thorny ques-
tion of whether there are meaningful limits on the executive branch’s discre-
tion to not enforce the law.
The fight over DAPA5 is just one example of what has become an
increasingly controversial aspect of administrative law: nonenforcement.6
Similar fights have played out over federal narcotics policy,7 the Affordable
1 Brief for the Petitioners at 36–37, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)
(No. 15-674).
2 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
3 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016) (mem.); see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3
(stating that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”).
4 See Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 2272.
5 See, e.g., Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the
Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 219 (2015) (challenging legality); Jason A. Cade, Enforc-
ing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 694 (2015) (characterizing DAPA as a
“systematic and categorical implementation of enforcement discretion”). See generally Rob-
ert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of
Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013)
(arguing that such nonenforcement is unconstitutional); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The
Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244 (2010)
(defending nonenforcement).
6 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 265, 273–74 (2013); Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164
U. PA. L. REV. 1753, 1769 (2016); Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and
the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1199–1200 (2014); Zachary S. Price, Enforce-
ment Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 697 (2014); Daniel T. Deacon,
Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 796 (2010); Daniel
Stepanicich, Comment, Presidential Inaction and the Constitutional Basis for Executive Nonen-
forcement Discretion, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1507, 1510–11 (2016).
7 See, e.g., Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and Marijuana
Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 183, 183 (2016)
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Care Act,8 various welfare programs,9 and how to regulate “in the wake of the
financial crisis.”10  All the while, scholars have also considered whether there
are bounds to the nonenforcement power11 and, if so, where the line should
be drawn and how such a line could be enforced.12  Indeed, some have even
suggested that if a future administration does not like certain types of federal
taxes, perhaps it can simply decline to collect them.13
This recent focus on nonenforcement is noteworthy because an agency’s
decision to let violations occur is not the typical emphasis of administrative
law scholarship.  After all, when one thinks of regulatory decisions, what
often comes to mind are affirmative actions to ensure that the law is obeyed,
which often includes ensuring that legal prohibitions are respected and, if
appropriate, that violations of such prohibitions are sanctioned.  Yet nonen-
forcement demonstrates that is not all that agencies do.  Instead, agencies
sometimes allow violations of the law to go without enjoinment or sanction.
Some nonenforcement, of course, is often beneficial and, in any event,
inevitable.  Agencies have finite resources; it is impossible for them to investi-
(explaining that federal prosecutors will use discretion to not enforce federal drug laws
against marijuana so long as state law allows it and various other conditions are met); see
also Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Gui-
dance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 3 (Aug. 29, 2013) (explaining that where strong
state regulatory systems exist controlling the usage and sale of marijuana, federal prosecu-
tors have additional discretion in deciding whether to enforce federal drug laws against
marijuana); Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Marijuana Enforcement 1 (Jan. 4, 2018) (rescinding previous guidance).
8 See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Simon Lazarus, Obama’s ACA Delays—Breaking
the Law or Making It Work?, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1970 (2014) (reviewing the Obama
administration’s decision not to enforce parts of the Affordable Care Act for a period of
time beyond that set out in the statute).
9 See, e.g., Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness, 38 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 63, 113–14 (2015) (arguing that the Obama administration was unlawfully
not enforcing certain statutory restrictions on eligibility).
10 See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen & David S. Huntington, Waivers from the Automatic Disqual-
ification Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 29 INSIGHTS 2, 2–3 (2015) (observing that
waiver decisions regarding financial institutions have become increasingly controversial).
11 See, e.g., Kamin, supra note 7, at 184; Zachary S. Price, Seeking Baselines for Negative
Authority: Constitutional and Rule-of-Law Arguments over Nonenforcement and Waiver, 8 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 235, 266–67 (2016); cf. Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion:
Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1194 (2015)
(“The fundamental legal and ‘common sense’ problem with DAPA is its shunning of any
intelligible limiting principle that situates executive discretion within the INA’s compre-
hensive framework.”).
12 See, e.g., Tom Campbell, Executive Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 558
(2017) (suggesting that Congress should have standing to seek judicial action requiring
the law to be enforced); Daniel E. Walters, The Judicial Role in Constraining Presidential Non-
enforcement Discretion: The Virtues of an APA Approach, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1911, 1934 (2016)
(urging review of nonenforcement under an arbitrary and capricious standard).
13 See, e.g., Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. 73, 73
(2015) (addressing potential categorical nonenforcement of tax laws).
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gate and punish every potential violation of the law.14  And sometimes there
are good reasons to not even try.  After all, a situation may be so distant from
what Congress or the agency had in mind when a general prohibition was put
on the books that enforcement makes no sense.  “Indeed, a central norma-
tive reason for separating legislative and executive functions, as articulated by
Montesquieu, the Federalist Papers, and other foundational sources, is to cre-
ate a safety valve that protects citizens from overzealous enforcement of gen-
eral prohibitions.”15  As Judge Stephanos Bibas has observed, no one should
bring a knife to a school.  Yet there is a world of difference between an adult
brandishing a switchblade and a child carrying a kitchen knife to cut a birth-
day cake.16  Just as prosecutorial discretion makes sense when it comes to
crimes by school children, nonenforcement has a place in administrative
law.17
At the same time, nonenforcement can raise troubling questions.  Even
apart from separation of powers concerns, nonenforcement implicates basic
notions of fairness and administrative regularity.  As with other forms of
administrative discretion,18 discretionary authority to determine when the
law should and should not be enforced can be put to good ends but is also
subject to abuse.19  In fact, “government by waiver,” if taken too far, is anti-
thetical to liberty.  As Richard Epstein has explained, agencies may be
tempted to overregulate, knowing that they can fall back on nonenforce-
ment.20  The result may be that regulated parties find themselves at the
mercy of the government, and “when currying the favor of capricious govern-
ment officials is required for a person’s well-being or a firm’s very existence,
government abuse becomes nearly impossible to oppose.”21  This danger
14 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (explaining resource con-
straints); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 381, 385
(2014) (similar).
15 Price, supra note 6, at 675; see also id. (collecting citations).
16 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L.
REV. 369, 370 (2010).
17 Cf. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436
(2006) (“The Government’s argument echoes the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats through-
out history: If I make an exception for you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no
exceptions.”).
18 See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J.
55, 57 (2016) (“The danger is that although discretion can be and, indeed, usually is used
for the public’s benefit, it can also serve self-interested ends—for instance by allowing reg-
ulators to make their own lives easier.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 77 (explaining that
“much of administrative law as we know it is addressed toward ‘the dangers associated with
the exercise of discretion’” (quoting Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the Administra-
tive State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1334 (2008))).
19 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Essay, Administrative Prosecutorial Indiscretion, 63 TUL. L. REV.
877, 880 (1989) (“As administrative agencies become more sensitive to political considera-
tions, their exercise of discretion is more likely to be in response to these concerns, rather
than to the facts and law of the specific cases.”).
20 See Richard A. Epstein, Government by Waiver, NAT’L AFF., Spring 2011, at 39.
21 Id. at 41.
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comes to the forefront when agencies deliberately engage in nonenforce-
ment for self-aggrandizing reasons, especially to obtain ends that are outside
of the agency’s statutory authority.22  But the risk of abuse can also arise in
more mundane situations, for instance, where agency officials, perhaps
unconsciously, play favorites.23
Although nonenforcement has received some theoretical consideration
in the academy, it has not received much empirical examination.  This Arti-
cle attempts to begin filling that void.  Drawing on survey data from nine
agencies and interviews with officials from the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau (CFPB), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA), and the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and
Trade Bureau (TTB), this Article explores nonenforcement (specifically
waivers, exemptions, and prosecutorial discretion) at these agencies.  This
empirical investigation, moreover, serves as a springboard for a hopefully
more fulsome conceptual understanding of when nonenforcement is danger-
ous and how to safeguard against abuse.  Indeed, this Article makes three
contributions to the nonenforcement literature.
First, Part I describes how certain agencies evaluate potential nonen-
forcement.  For instance, what are the steps and who is involved?  What pro-
cedures do they use?  How regularly do agencies engage in nonenforcement?
Do they reject requests for nonenforcement and, if so, how often?  Empiri-
cally, it turns out that the answers to these questions vary widely across agen-
cies.  Some agencies have robust nonenforcement practices; the FAA, for
instance, makes hundreds and sometimes even thousands of formal nonen-
forcement decisions per year.  Because of the volume of nonenforcement
decisions, the Agency has developed regularized procedures to evaluate
requests, which often include a public process.  By contrast, the CFPB has
developed two formal nonenforcement programs, one of which has never
been used, and the other of which has only been used once.  And the TTB
makes dozens of formal nonenforcement decisions each year but, due to pri-
vacy concerns, essentially never publishes them.  All the while, agency inspec-
tors informally may be making countless nonenforcement decisions each
day, particularly in certain industries.  There is at least one characteristic,
22 See id. at 50 (“It is common for the agency to insist that drug companies accept
conditions that are found nowhere in the statutory scheme—conditions that, for instance,
can limit the distribution or advertisement of a drug, or govern its recall in case a problem
with it should arise—in exchange for the FDA’s waiving other requirements or granting
early approval.”).
23 See, e.g., NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Complainants
the agency ‘likes’ can be excused, while ‘difficult’ defendants can find themselves drawing
the short straw.”); cf. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Essay, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When
Everything Is a Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102, 103 (2013) (“Attorney General (and
later Supreme Court Justice) Robert Jackson once commented: ‘If the prosecutor is
obliged to choose his cases, it follows he can choose his defendants.’  This method results
in ‘[t]he most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people he thinks he
should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted.’” (alteration in original)
(footnote omitted)).
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however, that cuts across agencies: very few of these decisions are ever chal-
lenged in court.
Second, reflecting this heterogeneity, this Article begins to sketch a tax-
onomy of nonenforcement.  Not all nonenforcement is the same and some
varieties of it are especially dangerous.  For example, nonenforcement may
be particularly susceptible to abuse when the agency acts sua sponte in a
scheme with opaque substantive standards and no notice-and-comment pro-
cedures.  By contrast, nonenforcement may be relatively less problematic
when the agency, acting upon a formal request, applies neutral standards
following a public comment process.  And these factors do not exhaust the
full range of potential considerations.  Until nonenforcement is disaggre-
gated, evaluation of it is incomplete.
And third, this Article explores how to prevent nonenforcement from
being abused.  Most importantly, nonenforcement and retrospective review
should not be understood as discrete aspects of administrative law.  Instead,
successful requests for nonenforcement, especially when there are many simi-
lar ones, should be understood as a presumptive signal that the agency
should engage in retrospective review.  If a prohibition no longer makes
sense, it is understandable that agencies may employ their nonenforcement
authority.  But rather than rely too much on nonenforcement, the better
path may be simply to change the law for everyone.
I. BRIEF BACKGROUND
Nonenforcement is an important part of administrative law.  The issue
has taken on particular significance in recent years as presidents have begun
aggressively using nonenforcement for ideological ends.
Administrative law has long recognized the benefits of nonenforcement.
This recognition is well illustrated by Heckler v. Chaney,24 “one of the modern
landmarks of administrative law.”25  In Heckler, the Court confronted alleged
nonenforcement by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  A group of
death row inmates challenged the Agency’s refusal to regulate certain drugs
that states were using for executions.  The Agency disagreed with the prison-
ers’ view of the law, but also declared that even if the prisoners were right,
the Agency would not enforce federal law in these circumstances because
“enforcement proceedings in this area are initiated only when there is a seri-
ous danger to the public health or a blatant scheme to defraud.”26  The D.C.
Circuit held that the Agency’s decision was reviewable.27
The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that at least when it comes to
whether to bring an enforcement action, agency nonenforcement should “be
presumed unreviewable under the ‘committed to agency discretion’ excep-
24 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
25 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 159 (1996).
26 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 824–25.
27 Id. at 825.
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tion to the general rule of reviewability under the APA.”28  The Court
explained, among other points, that nonenforcement requires “a compli-
cated balancing” that considers not only whether the law has been violated,
but also “whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or
another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particu-
lar enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and,
indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at
all.”29  Likewise, “when an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise
its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does
not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect.”30  And
an agency’s decision not to bring an enforcement action is analogous to “the
decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision
which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive
Branch.”31  Hence, unless, for instance, Congress has “provided guidelines
for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers,” an agency’s
decision not to bring an enforcement action cannot be reviewed in court.32
This is not to say, however, that all nonenforcement decisions cannot be
reviewed.  Sometimes, for instance, the presumption is rebutted.  In FEC v.
Akins,33 a case about whether an agency must require disclosure of certain
election-related information, the Court concluded that the Heckler presump-
tion was overcome because the Court addressed “a statute that explicitly indi-
cates” that the agency must act.34  Likewise, the D.C. Circuit concluded in a
case with facts similar to those in Heckler that the presumption was rebutted.
In Cook v. FDA,35 the court held that certain prisoners could challenge the
FDA’s refusal to bring an enforcement action against importers of drugs used
in executions because Congress “set[ ] forth precisely when the agency must
determine whether a drug offered for import appears to violate [federal
law].”36
The Heckler presumption likewise does not extend to denials of petitions
for rulemaking.  This point was made in Massachusetts v. EPA.37  There, the
Court did not use Heckler to evaluate an agency’s refusal to issue a notice of
proposed rulemaking.  The Court explained that “[t]here are key differences
between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and an agency’s decision not to
initiate an enforcement action,” including the fact that “agency refusals to
initiate rulemaking ‘are less frequent, more apt to involve legal as opposed to
factual analysis, and subject to special formalities, including a public explana-
28 Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 653, 662 (1985) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982)).
29 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.
30 Id. at 832.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 833.
33 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
34 Id. at 26.
35 733 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
36 Id. at 7.
37 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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tion.’”38  Accordingly, even though “an agency has broad discretion to
choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out
its delegated responsibilities,” Heckler does not apply, but, to be sure, review
of an agency denial of a petition for rulemaking is “extremely limited” and
“highly deferential.”39
Another type of nonenforcement that is reviewable occurs when an
agency only partially engages in nonenforcement.  An example is when an
agency determines not to enforce one of its procedural rules within a pro-
ceeding.  The D.C. Circuit addressed this situation in NetworkIP, LLC v.
FCC.40  There, a complainant was late in filing a complaint against a pair of
telecommunications companies for two reasons: it was supposed to include
two checks with its complaint instead of just one, and its filing fee “was $5.00
short.”41  The FCC determined that it would waive its procedural rules under
its general authority to excuse compliance “if good cause therefor is
shown.”42  The D.C. Circuit reviewed that exercise of the Agency’s waiver
authority and rejected it, ruling that “before the FCC can invoke its good
cause exception, it both ‘must explain why deviation better serves the public
interest, and articulate the nature of the special circumstances to prevent
discriminatory application and to put future parties on notice as to its opera-
tion.’”43  Otherwise, “[c]omplainants the agency ‘likes’ can be excused, while
‘difficult’ defendants can find themselves drawing the short straw.”44  The
court explained that although agencies are afforded deference when it
comes to waiver, “procrastination plus the universal tendency for things to go
wrong (Murphy’s Law)—at the worst possible moment (Finagle’s Corol-
lary)—is not a ‘special circumstance,’ as any junior high teacher can attest.”45
Agency refusals to engage in nonenforcement can also sometimes be
reviewed, though, again, agencies receive a great deal of deference.  In
Blanca Telephone Co. v. FCC,46 for instance, the Agency promulgated a
requirement that handsets be compatible with hearing aids.  Unfortunately,
many providers could not meet the Agency’s deadline and requested waivers.
The Agency granted many of these requests but not all, concluding that some
companies had not done enough to try to comply with the new requirements.
Those companies then unsuccessfully sought judicial review.  The D.C. Cir-
cuit concluded that an agency’s refusal to grant a waiver will be upheld so
long as the agency offers an “adequate explanation before it treats similarly
38 Id. at 527 (quoting Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
39 Id. at 527–28 (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am. v. United
States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40 548 F.3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
41 Id. at 126.
42 47 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2017).
43 NetworkIP, 548 F.3d at 127 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ne. Cellular Tel. Co. v.
FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 743 F.3d 860 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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situated parties differently.”47  Similarly, if nonenforcement is implemented
on a categorical basis, as opposed to through individualized assessments, judi-
cial review may be available.48  The idea is that a general nonenforcement
policy is more likely to be based on statutory interpretation than on a careful
assessment of individualized evidence.49
Another potentially reviewable form of nondiscretion occurs when an
agency prospectively authorizes conduct that would otherwise be unlawful —
for instance, via an exemption or waiver—for an individual entity or for a
class of entities.  To the extent, for instance, that this sort of decision is con-
ceived of as an exercise of the agency’s permitting authority, such a decision
is reviewable, so long as the other justiciability requirements are met (which
sometimes can be challenging).50
Unsurprisingly, there are open questions about nonenforcement.  Per-
haps most importantly, can nonenforcement violate the Take Care Clause51
and, if so, when?  This is a difficult question because, as the Supreme Court
explained in Heckler, some nonenforcement is inescapable and judicial
efforts to zealously police it will mire courts in agency management decisions
because of competing resource demands.52  Beyond that, does anyone deny
that it does not always make sense to execute the law in a maximalist fash-
ion—that there is a place for some enforcement discretion?53  Thus, there
does not appear to be any appetite to eliminate nonenforcement altogether.
On the other hand, if the executive branch can simply refuse to enforce a
statute because the President disagrees with the legislature’s policy choice,
Congress’s powers may be negated.  Can that outcome be reconciled with the
Take Care Clause?
As noted above, that constitutional question was briefed at the Supreme
Court’s sua sponte insistence in the United States v. Texas litigation about
DAPA.  The United States urged that the Take Care Clause be deemed non-
justiciable: “For the Judicial Branch to undertake such an inquiry would
express a ‘lack of the respect due’ to the Nation’s highest elected official, by
47 Id. at 864 (quoting Morris Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 566 F.3d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir.
2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48 See, e.g., Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pen˜a, 37 F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(“[A]n agency’s statement of a general enforcement policy may be reviewable for legal
sufficiency where the agency has expressed the policy as a formal regulation.” (emphasis
omitted)).
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., New World Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 294 F.3d 164, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting
a challenge to a license for lack of standing).
51 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President “shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed”).
52 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834–35 (1985).
53 Cf. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2092 (2014) (“[W]e have traditionally
viewed the exercise of state officials’ prosecutorial discretion as a valuable feature of our
constitutional system.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Yates v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. 13-7451) (“What kind of a mad prosecutor would try to send this guy
up . . . ?”) (Scalia, J.).
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assuming judicial superintendence over the exercise of Executive power that
the Clause commits to the President.”54  The United States also said that it
was faithfully executing the law by focusing on the greatest risks, thus using
the resources it had been allocated in a permissible way.  Texas and the other
relevant states disagreed, explaining, among other points, that the govern-
ment’s argument has no limiting principle: “A future President could ‘cease
enforcing environmental laws, or the Voting Rights Act, or even the various
laws that protect civil rights and equal opportunity’—deeming unlawful con-
duct to be lawful when faced with resource constraints.”55  Because the Jus-
tices split, the Supreme Court did not issue an opinion.
II. NONENFORCEMENT’S HETEROGENEITY
To date, little empirical work has been done on nonenforcement.  This
Article begins to fill the void by providing data about some of the practices of
nine agencies.  Based on the result of this study, it appears that nonenforce-
ment practices are notably heterogeneous.  Different agencies have different
authorizations to engage in nonenforcement; they also use different
processes to evaluate potential nonenforcement, use their nonenforcement
authority for different types of situations, engage in markedly different
amounts of nonenforcement, and work within contexts with different types
of checks and balances regarding nonenforcement.  For reasons explained
below, understanding this heterogeneity is important when evaluating the
costs and benefits of nonenforcement discretion and potential safeguards on
it.
A. Study Methodology
This study does not purport to be a comprehensive empirical analysis of
all agencies.  It is, however, a preliminary investigation of the subject for
some agencies.  To conduct the study, the author prepared a five-part survey.
The first part addressed specific statutory authorization to “waive” legal
duties for private entities, with waiver being defined as express authority from
Congress to excuse private parties from legal duties.  The second part
addressed specific statutory authorization to “waive” such duties for states
(i.e., so-called “federalism waivers”).  The third part addressed agency
“exemption” authority, with exemption being defined as power to excise pri-
vate parties from legal duties even without specific congressional authoriza-
tion to do so.  The fourth part addressed prosecutorial discretion, which was
defined as authority to not enforce the law against already-completed viola-
54 Brief for the Petitioners at 73, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No.
15-674) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)); see also id. at 73–74 (“Indeed,
this Court has recognized that ‘the duty of the President in the exercise of the power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed’ ‘is purely executive and political,’ and not subject to
judicial direction.” (quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 499 (1866))).
55 Brief for the State Respondents at 74, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)
(No. 15-674).
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tions of legal duties.  And finally, the fifth part contained various catch-all
questions (e.g., whether the agency engaged in conduct akin to one of the
other categories).  Within each part were specific questions.  Some of these
questions addressed whether the agency has such authority, how often the
agency is asked to use its authority, how often the agency actually does so,
whether the agency can exercise such authority without a request, what pro-
cedures the agency must use, and whether decisions are publicly available.
Working with an ACUS staff member, the survey was then sent to numerous
agencies.56
Following that initial contact and several follow-up messages, nine agen-
cies submitted a survey response: the TTB, Community Development Finan-
cial Institutions Fund (“CDFI Fund”), CFPB, Employee Benefits Security
Administration (EBSA), FAA, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA), Federal Transit Administration (FTA), Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA), and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA).  The TTB and CDFI Fund are both part of the
Treasury Department; the EBSA and MSHA are within the Labor Depart-
ment; the FAA, FMCSA, FTA, and PHMSA are part of the Transportation
Department; and the CFPB is an “independent bureau” within the Federal
Reserve System.  Not all of these agencies answered every question, but each
answered at least some of the questions.  Many of these agencies shared data
about their nonenforcement practices—often detailed data.  Many also pro-
vided specific information regarding the procedures used to make nonen-
forcement decisions.
After reviewing these surveys, and still working with an ACUS staff mem-
ber, the author was able to arrange in-person interviews with representatives
of the FAA, MSHA, and TTB.  The author also arranged an interview via
telephone with representatives of the CFPB.  These interviews were not
recorded but detailed notes were kept by interns.  The purpose of these
interviews was to gain a deeper understanding of the agencies’ specific prac-
tices.  Afterwards, a draft report was prepared.  The agencies that agreed to
participate in these interviews were given an opportunity to review that draft
report for accuracy.57
B. General Study Findings
The most apparent finding is that agency nonenforcement practices vary
widely, including in frequency, transparency, and procedural steps.
56 The survey is attached as an appendix to the Author’s ACUS Report. See Aaron L.
Nielson, Admin. Conference of the U.S., Waivers, Exemptions, and Prosecutorial Discre-
tion: An Examination of Agency Nonenforcement Practices 68–71 (2017), https://
www.acus.gov/report/regulatory-waivers-and-exemptions-final-report.
57 Unfortunately, because even seemingly common terms like “waiver” or “exemption”
do not appear to have uniformly shared definitions, and because the contexts in which
these terms are applied vary widely, it can be difficult to conduct cross-agency analysis.
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1. Waiver
A majority of the agencies that participated in the survey identified
authority to waive some statutory or regulatory requirements.  In fact, the
FAA has so many potential authorizations of waiver that it was unable to cata-
log them all but did list eight distinct grants of statutory waiver authority.58
The TTB also listed eight grants of statutory authority.59  The PHMSA can
waive duties under the Hazardous Materials Safety Enhancement Program60
and the Pipeline Safety Program,61 while the FMCSA has authority to not
enforce motor carrier safety duties62 and the FTA may waive certain grant
and “Buy America” requirements.63  The MSHA can waive mine safety
requirements under its “petitions for modification”64 process.65
Although many agencies have authority to waive requirements, how
often they exercise that authority is far from uniform.  The TTB, for instance,
receives fewer “than 25” requests in a typical year.66  The PHMSA, by con-
trast, receives over 1800 requests relating to hazardous materials alone.67
The FMCSA receives less than a dozen requests, while the MSHA receives
approximately fifty requests per year.  The FAA has only recently begun
recording the number of waiver requests it receives so there is no data yet.
Agencies also grant markedly different percentages of requests.  The FMCSA
and FTA grant virtually all requests.68  The MSHA, by contrast, grants some-
where in the range of 36%.69  The PHMSA simply says it “[v]aries.”70  And
the TTB grants “[a]pproximately 85%” of requests.71
Similarly, at least among this group of agencies, sua sponte waivers are
uncommon.  The PHMSA, MSHA, and TTB never exercise waiver authority
without a request.  The FMCSA says it has only done so “once to date,” and
58 FAA Survey Response (on file with author) (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 40125(d), 41104,
44710(f), 44706, 44721, 44726(f), 47528(b)(1) (2012); 51 U.S.C. §§ 50901–50923 (2012)).
59 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5181(b), 5201(b), 5312, 5417, 5554, 5556, 5561, 5562 (2012).
60 See 49 U.S.C. § 5117(a)(1).
61 See id. § 60118(c)(1)(A).
62 See id. §§ 31136(e), 31315(a).
63 See id. §§ 5323(j)(2), 5324(d).  The FTA also has nonenforcement authority regard-
ing emergencies. See id. § 5324(e)(3).
64 See infra subsection II.C.iii.
65 The CFPB and the CDFI Fund do not list any waiver authority in their survey
responses, and the EBSA classifies its nonenforcement authority as exemption authority.
See CDFI Fund Survey Response (on file with author); CFPB Survey Response (on file with
author); EBSA Survey Response (on file with author).
66 TTB Survey Response (on file with author).
67 PHMSA Survey Response (on file with author).  Almost half of these, however, were
requests for renewals.  The agency typically receives less than ten special permit requests
for pipelines. Id.
68 See FMCSA Survey Response (on file with author); FTA Survey Response (on file
with author).
69 MSHA Survey Response (on file with author).  This point may be slightly mislead-
ing.  Many requests are withdrawn rather than denied.
70 PHMSA Survey Response, supra note 67.
71 TTB Survey Response, supra note 66.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL406.txt unknown Seq: 13 31-MAY-18 8:41
2018] how  agencies  choose  whether  to  enforce  the  law 1529
that was only a “limited 90-day waiver.”72  The FTA did so once as well: “Sub-
sequent to Hurricane Sandy, FTA issued blanket waivers for several statutory
and regulatory provisions.”73  Thus, at least among these agencies, almost all
waivers require a request from a regulated party.
Procedures also vary.  For instance, Congress set forth specific require-
ments for the PHMSA (including both procedural and substantive require-
ments),74 and ordered the Agency to deal with applications quickly.75
Congress also specified how long such nonenforcement could continue.76
And as to pipelines, Congress specifically requires the PHMSA to give a rea-
son for granting a waiver.77  By contrast, Congress has declared that a waiver
from the FMCSA cannot exceed three months, must be “limited in scope,”
must be “for nonemergency and unique events,” and will be “subject to such
conditions as the Secretary may impose.”78  The FTA uses notice-and-com-
ment procedures, and “will issue a formal determination, which also is pub-
lished in the Federal Register.”79  The process used by the FAA, MSHA, and
TTB is explained in greater detail below;80 for purposes here, it is enough to
observe that their procedures differ markedly.
Finally, some, but not all, of these agencies make their waiver decisions
public or provide public notice during the evaluation process.  The TTB, for
instance, does not because “the decisions are fact-specific, and disclosure
rules under the Internal Revenue Code generally prevent the agency from
publicizing the decisions.”81  Similarly, the FMCSA reports that it may “grant
short-term waivers for special situations without providing public notice.”82
The MSHA, however, “publishes all petitions for modification, as well as all
granted modifications, in the Federal Register,” and “publishes all decisions (or
dispositions of any type) on its website.”83  The PHMSA also makes its deci-
sions public.84  The FTA also “publishes requests for waivers and responses in
the emergency relief docket on www.regulations.gov” and publishes other
types of decisions on its own webpage or in the Federal Register.85  Similarly,
“the FAA publishes those decisions in the Federal Register[ ] that are novel,
72 FMCSA Survey Response, supra note 68.
73 FTA Survey Response, supra note 68.
74 See 49 U.S.C. § 5117(b) (2012) (requiring a “safety analysis,” notice-and-comment
procedures, and other transparency mechanisms).
75 See id. § 5117(c) (requiring prompt action or an explanation for delay).
76 See id. § 5117(a)(2) (unless extension granted, limited to two years).
77 See id. § 60118(c).
78 See id. § 31315(a).
79 FTA Survey Response, supra note 68 (discussing 49 U.S.C. § 5323(m)(3) and 49
C.F.R. § 661.7 (2017)).
80 See infra subsections II.C.ii–iv.
81 TTB Survey Response, supra note 66.
82 MSHA Survey Response, supra note 69.
83 FMCSA Survey Response, supra note 68.
84 PHMSA Survey Response, supra note 67; see also 49 U.S.C. § 5117(b).
85 FTA Survey Response, supra note 68.
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significant, or are of first impression to alert the public to such
determinations.”86
2. Exemptions
The TTB, FTA, CFPB, and CDFI Fund do not list any exemption author-
ity.  The other agencies do, however—and the number of requests for
exemptions can be remarkable.  The PHMSA, for instance, reports
“[a]pproximately 16,000” requests per year, of which it grants between 70%
and 85% depending on the type.87  Likewise, since August 2016, when “the
FAA published a final rule allowing civil operation” of certain types of
unmanned aircraft systems, it has received over 16,000 requests; it has
granted about 25%, denied slightly less than 50%, and has not yet decided
the rest.88  The FAA “receives approximately 400–500 requests for exemption
per year” for other programs, of which it grants approximately 75%.89  The
FMCSA receives about 1100 requests per year, and grants just shy of 60%.90
In contrast to these large numbers, the EBSA reports that it typically receives
fewer than 100 requests and that it does not grant many of them.  Indeed, at
least as of July 31, 2017, it had not granted any in 2017.91
As with waivers, these agencies with exemption authority typically do not
often grant exemptions without a petition or application.  The PHMSA, for
instance, says it never does so;92 the FAA “typically” does not.93  The EBSA
reports that between 2012 and 2016, the Agency “granted an exemption with-
out a formal applicant approximately 9 times (2 new exemptions and 7
amendments to existing exemptions),” but stressed that “[i]t is unlikely that
EBSA would propose an individual exemption on its own motion.”94 The
FMCSA has only done so “once to date.”95
The procedures these agencies use also diverge.  The FAA has a public
docket for requests, and “[m]ost requests are reviewed by an attorney in the
Regulations Division of the FAA’s Office of the Chief Counsel.”96  The
FMCSA also has an office that is “responsible for reviewing exemption
requests and making recommendations to the Administrator.”97  The EBSA’s
procedures vary, depending on the type of exemption at issue.98  The
86 FAA Survey Response, supra note 58.
87 PHMSA Survey Response, supra note 67.
88 FAA Survey Response, supra note 58.
89 Id.
90 FMCSA Survey Response, supra note 68.
91 EBSA Survey Response, supra note 65.
92 PHMSA Survey Response, supra note 67.
93 See FAA Survey Response, supra note 58.
94 EBSA Survey Response, supra note 65.
95 FMCSA Survey Response, supra note 68.
96 FAA Survey Response, supra note 58.
97 FMCSA Survey Response, supra note 68.
98 EBSA Survey Response, supra note 65.
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PHMSA has an entire “desk guide” to explain its procedures.99  Each, how-
ever, attempts to publicize its decisions.
3. Prosecutorial Discretion
Agencies were not forthcoming regarding prosecutorial discretion.  The
PHMSA, EBSA, MSHA, and CDFI Fund, for instance, did not respond to this
section of the survey.  Agencies, it appears, may not wish to share specifics,
presumably in hopes of encouraging greater compliance.100
Of the agencies that did respond, most answers were not expansive.  The
TTB simply said “no” when asked whether it ever “choose[s] not to enforce
the law against known violations.”101  The FTA said that “[t]o the extent pos-
sible violations are discovered, FTA requires grantees to take corrective
action[ ].”102
Some responses, however, were more detailed.  The FAA, in particular,
said this:
[T]he FAA does not exempt persons who have violated FAA statutes or regu-
lations from the requirements of those provisions.  Rather, when an FAA
inspection produces sufficient evidence to conclude that a regulated person
has violated a statute or regulation, the FAA takes action appropriate to
address the noncompliance.  The types of actions the FAA takes, and the
bases for selecting such actions, are detailed in FAA Order 2150.3B, chap. 5,
at 5-1 to 5-9, which guides FAA personnel in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion (available online).  Pursuant to this policy, the FAA may take com-
pliance action, administrative action, or legal enforcement action.
The FAA generally uses compliance and administrative actions (which
do not result in remedial or punitive FAA enforcement) to ensure that regu-
lated persons return to full compliance and take measures to prevent recur-
rence.  It is appropriate for FAA personnel to take legal enforcement action
(for remedial or punitive proposes) against a regulated person for noncom-
pliances resulting from: intentional conduct, reckless conduct, failure to
complete corrective action, conduct creating or threatening to create an
unacceptable risk to safety, conduct where legal enforcement action is
required by law, repeated noncompliance, the provision of inaccurate data
99 See PHMSA Survey Response, supra note 67; see also PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERI-
ALS SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., APPROVALS PROGRAM DESK GUIDE (2016).
100 See, e.g., Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1192–93 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA)] Exemption 7(E) shields information if ‘disclosure could
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.’  If the FOIA request here sought
a checklist used by agents to detect fraudulent tax schemes or the words most likely to
trigger increased surveillance during a wiretap, the applicability of the exemption would
be obvious.” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2008))); see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,
My Great FOIA Adventure and Discoveries of Deferred Action Cases at ICE, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
345 (2013) (describing how difficult it is to get this information).  Although some secrecy
is understandable, it is not altogether for the good.  After all, to the extent that one might
worry about unequal treatment and “insiders” having privileged access to information, this
secrecy may enable agencies to engage in such conduct.
101 TTB Survey Response, supra note 66.
102 FTA Survey Response, supra note 68.
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to the FAA, actions pertaining to competency or qualification, and law
enforcement-related activities.  Regardless of how a noncompliance is
addressed, the regulated person must return to compliance, now and for the
future, or legal enforcement action may be taken.103
Similarly, the FMCSA also had interesting thoughts on the subject that
merit quotation in full:
In addition, FMCSA conducted almost 8,000 investigations in FY2016.
Regulatory violations of varying severity are found in almost every investiga-
tion.  The investigations resulted in the issuance of approximately 4,400
Notices of Claim alleging one or more violations of the safety, commercial,
or hazardous materials regulations.  As more fully described below, FMCSA
regularly discovers violations for which it chooses not to take enforcement
action.  FMCSA’s overarching goal is safety, so before it initiates an enforce-
ment action, it considers whether that enforcement action is the best
method for achieving compliance. . . . Because it is likely that regulatory
violations were found in almost all of the investigations, FMCSA’s decision to
not issue Notices of Claim in the other 3,000+ investigations could be
described as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.104
Because of the limited response rate, prosecutorial discretion remains in
many respects an empirical mystery, even among these agencies.
4. Miscellaneous
Finally, the survey also asked about the role those outside the agency
play in nonenforcement decisions.  Interestingly, each of the agencies that
participated and that answered this question stated that those outside of the
agency do not participate—at least not “generally.”105  Of course, this point
does not necessarily extend to all agencies.  We know that sometimes those
outside of the agency do participate.  For instance, the White House’s
involvement in immigration nonenforcement is well documented.106  But
this does suggest that involvement by those outside of the agencies may be
limited.
The survey also asked agencies of their view of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis
in NetworkIP, which vacated an agency’s decision to waive a procedural rule
because “special circumstances” were not present.107  Many of the surveyed
agencies did not respond to this question.  One simply said it agreed with the
103 FAA Survey Response, supra note 58; see also FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSP., GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FAA COMPLIANCE PHILOSOPHY (2015).
104 FMCSA Survey Response, supra note 68.
105 FAA Survey Response, supra note 58; see also EBSA Survey Response, supra note 65
(“With EBSA’s decisions to grant statutory waivers, administrative exemptions that are
processed on a class rather than individual basis are processed much like regulatory initia-
tives and will undergo a Departmental Clearance process prior to submission to the Office
of Management and Budget.”); FAA Survey Response, supra note 58 (“In some instances,
the agency may consult with other federal entities if their interests warrant consideration,
such as aircraft operations over national parks.”).
106 See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5.
107 See NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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analysis with little explanation,108 while another largely said the same.109
Because agencies frequently appear before the D.C. Circuit, their reticence
to comment on that court’s cases is understandable.  That said, two agencies
did share some interesting thoughts.
The FMCSA addressed NetworkIP at some length.  Specifically, the
Agency explained that:
FMCSA generally agrees with the court’s view in NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC,
548 F.3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  Criteria that set forth the special circum-
stances where waiver of or exemption from a rule is appropriate increase the
likelihood of consistent and predictable outcomes.  Nonetheless, the pur-
pose of waivers and exemptions is to give an agency the flexibility to reach
an equitable result in a particular situation.  It is not feasible or efficient for
an agency to contemplate the multitude of circumstances that would warrant
waivers and exemptions across the broad spectrum of rules it administers.
While more specific waiver and exemption criteria may be feasible in limited
circumstances, such as in the case of the filing deadline considered by the
court in NetworkIP, in many instances the decision regarding whether to
grant a waiver or exemption is more appropriately based on the totality of
the circumstances, particularly when significant policy considerations are
present.  As long as an agency adequately articulates the special circum-
stances that warrant deviation from the rule at issue, future parties are on
notice as to how the agency will interpret its rule and judicial review is not
frustrated.  Moreover, such a view is consistent with the court’s position in
NetworkIP that an agency is afforded deference regarding its decision
whether to waive one of its own rules.
As specifically concerns FMCSA’s waiver and exemption authority and
regulatory standards for exercising that authority, we would note inciden-
tally that the Agency’s exercise of discretion is defined by the requirement
that relief from regulatory obligations in such circumstances would likely
achieve a level of safety equivalent to or greater than the level that would be
achieved absent the involved waiver or exemption.  Accordingly, FMCSA’s
waiver and exemption statutory framework and regulatory structure is con-
strained by a safety-related standard that is inherently more stringent than
“whatever is consistent with the public interest” as referenced by the D.C.
Circuit’s NetworkIP ruling.110
The EBSA also addressed this question—and identified the downside of
overly rigid requirements.
Greater clarity on the criteria used to make waiver determinations will
instill the public’s trust that its government institutions are not making deci-
sions in an arbitrary manner.  However, agencies need flexibility in applying
criteria used to grant waivers in order to avoid treating all applications the
108 TTB Survey Response, supra note 66.
109 See CDFI Fund Survey Response, supra note 65 (agreeing that “grants of waivers
should be determined in a fair and equitable manner”); TTB Survey Response, supra note
66 (“Yes.  Because TTB’s waiver decisions are frequently fact-specific and generally subject
to disclosure restrictions, criteria used to evaluate waiver requests should be clear and
applied consistently to regulated parties.”).
110 FMCSA Survey Response, supra note 68 (quoting NetworkIP, 548 F.3d at 127).
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same.  Exemption applications submitted to EBSA are very fact-specific, and
a decision whether or not to grant an exemption may turn on one small
detail.  A more rigid set of criteria that focuses less on the individual facts of
an application may either cause EBSA to grant exemptions that it would not
currently grant, or to deny applications otherwise deserving of exemptive
relief.111
C. Four Case Studies
The study also addressed four agencies in some detail: the CFPB, FAA,
MSHA, and TTB.  The following case studies are based on interviews with
agency officials, agency survey responses, and additional research.  The views
expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the agencies, especially because
even within agencies, practices may not be monolithic.  But these case studies
are interesting.
1. The CFPB
Consider first the CFPB, a new agency that regulates consumer-focused
financial products and services.112  This Agency merits attention because
although several of the laws it administers explicitly allow nonenforce-
ment,113 the CFPB does not engage in much of it, at least in certain contexts.
To be sure, when implementing a statute through rulemaking, the CFPB may
identify requirements that do not make sense for certain categories of enti-
ties through the notice-and-comment process.  But, as to individual compa-
nies, the CFPB’s formal nonenforcement experience is limited, despite the
Agency’s authority and efforts to create nonenforcement programs.  Infor-
mally, however, the Agency does engage in nonenforcement, especially dur-
ing investigations.
Perhaps the best example is the Trial Disclosure Program, which the
Agency described in the Federal Register.114  The Agency can approve, follow-
ing a proposal from a regulated entity, disclosures that would otherwise be
unlawful.115  To implement that statutory power, the CFPB solicited com-
ments.  Following that process, the Agency finalized its program.  An appli-
cant must submit a proposal that “[d]escribe[s] how these changes are
111 EBSA Survey Response, supra note 65.
112 Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2018).
113 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831t, 5532(e)(2) (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639, 1691c–2(g)(2)
(2012).
114 See Policy to Encourage Trial Disclosure Programs; Information Collection, 78 Fed.
Reg. 64,389 (Oct. 29, 2013).
115 See 12 U.S.C. § 5532(e)(1)–(2) (stating that the Agency, through a public process,
“may permit a covered person to conduct a trial program that is limited in time and scope,
subject to specified standards and procedures, for the purpose of providing trial disclo-
sures to consumers[,]” and that such a person “shall be deemed to be in compliance with,
or may be exempted from, a requirement of a rule or an enumerated consumer law”).
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expected to improve upon existing disclosures, particularly with respect to
consumer use, consumer understanding, and/or cost-effectiveness,” and
“[p]rovide[s] a reasonable basis for expecting these improvements, and met-
rics for testing whether such improvements are realized.”116  Thereafter, the
CFPB evaluates the proposal using factors that include “[t]he extent to which
the program anticipates, controls for, and mitigates risks to consumers.”117
Approvals are made public.118  Despite the efforts put into creating this pro-
gram, however, the Trial Disclosure Program has not resulted in a single
approved or denied proposal.  Simply put, no one has used it.
The same is largely true of the CFPB’s “no action” letters.  Staff may issue
one of these nonbinding letters if there is no intention to recommend initia-
tion of an enforcement or supervisory action.  Like the Trial Disclosure Pro-
gram, the CFPB has established a system for granting such letters, which was
also implemented again after soliciting public comments.119  Agency staff
may issue such letters “involving innovative financial products or services that
promise substantial consumer benefit where there is substantial uncertainty
whether or how specific provisions of statutes implemented or regulations
issued by the Bureau would be applied.”120  Such letters, as a rule, “would be
publicly disclosed.”121  Again, however, despite the Agency’s efforts to create
and popularize this program, it has only been used once to date.122
During the interview and follow-up communications, officials stressed
that they would like these programs to be used.  And they do not know for
sure why the programs have not been used.  One possibility is that the cur-
rent regulations are so familiar that regulated parties do not want to spend
the resources necessary to prepare a proposal, especially if it means being the
first one to do so.  The fact that the process is public may also be an issue;
companies may be hesitant to open themselves up to scrutiny.  Ignorance is
possible too, but that does not seem likely; many of these regulated entities
are sophisticated.
116 Policy to Encourage Trial Disclosure Programs; Information Collection, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 64,393 (footnote omitted).
117 Id. at 64,394.
118 See id. (“The Bureau will publish notice on its Web site of any trial disclosure pro-
gram that it approves for a waiver.  The notice will: (i) Identify the company or companies
conducting the trial disclosure program; (ii) summarize the changed disclosures to be
used, their intended purpose, and the duration of their intended use; (iii) summarize the
scope of the waiver and the Bureau’s reasons for granting it; and (iv) state that the waiver
only applies to the testing company or companies in accordance with the approved terms
of use.”).
119 Like the Trial Disclosure Program, the No-Action Letter policy was also published in
the Federal Register. See Policy on No-Action Letters; Information Collection, 81 Fed. Reg.
8686 (Feb. 22, 2016).
120 Id. at 8686.  Such letters “may be conditioned on particular undertakings by the
applicant with respect to product or service usage and data-sharing with the Bureau.” Id.
121 Id.
122 See CFPB Announces First No-Action Letter to Upstart Network, CONSUMER FIN. PROTEC-
TION BUREAU (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/
cfpb-announces-first-no-action-letter-upstart-network/.
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Not surprisingly, the CFPB engages in prosecutorial discretion.  This
may be inevitable for agencies that supervise financial institutions because
there are so many of such institutions and there are many ways in which a
violation can occur.  The CFPB, however, has attempted to create a process
for such discretion.  Specially, the Agency prioritizes which violations are
most serious by using an examination manual that is publicly available.123
2. The FAA
Unlike the CFPB, the FAA engages in a large volume of formal nonen-
forcement.  And, perhaps because of that volume, it has developed both
expertise and regularized procedures.
In its survey response, the FAA identified eight sources of waiver author-
ity, plus it indicated that it “has a robust practice in considering regulatory
exemptions in general, as well as specific waiver programs that may be built
into those regulations.”124  And it is a “robust practice” indeed—the Agency
resolves thousands of requests for nonenforcement each year.125  This is
especially true regarding drones; in one year, the FAA received over 16,000
requests for drones.126  Beyond that, it regularly “receives approximately
400–500 requests for exemption per year.”127
The process for resolving nonenforcement requests is regularized.  It
begins with a formal request submitted to a public docket (on Regula-
tions.gov).  The FAA’s Office of Rulemaking then begins producing a formal
response.  In particular, requests “are assigned for review and disposition to
the program office . . . that covers the particular regulations from which
relief is requested.”128  “Most requests are reviewed by an attorney in the Reg-
ulations Division of the FAA’s Office of the Chief Counsel.”129  The answer is
placed on the public docket.  Requests for reconsideration are permitted,
and “[s]uch requests are ultimately reviewed by the Administrator to be con-
sidered final agency action.”130  Importantly, the public can comment during
this process and the Agency “regularly publishes a summary of requests for
exemption in the Federal Register for requests that are novel, significant, or
are of first impression to alert the public to such requests.”131
Like the CFPB, the FAA has a formalized guide for use by Agency “per-
sonnel in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”132  Specifically, the
Agency “may take compliance action, administrative action, or legal enforce-
123 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION PROCESS
(2017).
124 FAA Survey Response, supra note 58.
125 See id.
126 Id.
127 Id. (emphasis omitted).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 11.101 (2017)).
131 Id.
132 Id.
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ment action.”133  During the interview, officials stressed that the Agency is
more likely to pursue punitive action against serious violations,134 but “does
not exempt persons who have violated FAA statutes or regulations from the
requirements of those provisions.”135  Instead, if punitive measures are
deemed unwarranted, the Agency “generally uses compliance and adminis-
trative actions (which do not result in remedial or punitive FAA enforce-
ment) to ensure that regulated persons return to full compliance and take
measures to prevent recurrence.”136  Because safety is paramount, the
Agency is unlikely to accept the argument that compliance is too costly.  Like-
wise, although the Agency often declines enforcement on an individual
plane-by-plane basis, it is not opposed to fleet-wide decisions (for instance,
where there is a common issue).  The Agency does not place summaries of all
decisions in the Federal Register, but it tries to do so for the ones that break
new ground.  (Of course, what is novel may be in the eye of the beholder.
That said, the Agency emphasized that it tries to be transparent in its nonen-
forcement decisions.)
The Agency receives requests for nonenforcement from both large and
small companies.  Individuals sometimes seek nonenforcement too (for
instance, if a restraint system will not work for a particular person), but that is
often handled by the airlines.  Judicial review of one of these decisions is
almost unheard of.  The officials interviewed could only remember one such
suit, and it did not proceed to a formal judicial decision.137
3. The MSHA
The MSHA, which helps protect the health and safety of those working
in the mining industry, is, in many ways, somewhere in between the CFPB
and the FAA.  The MSHA is like the FAA because both are concerned with
safety and evaluate nonenforcement on those grounds.  It is like the CFPB,
however, because it does not engage in a large amount of nonenforcement;
whereas the FAA may evaluate thousands of requests for nonenforcement in
a year, the MSHA is likely to evaluate less than 100.
The MSHA has defined procedures for modifying future enforcement of
a particular standard (often adding replacement requirements), which the
133 Id.; see also FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 103.
134 FAA Survey Response, supra note 58 (“It is appropriate for FAA personnel to take
legal enforcement action (for remedial or punitive purposes) against a regulated person
for noncompliances resulting from: intentional conduct, reckless conduct, failure to com-
plete corrective action, conduct creating or threatening to create an unacceptable risk to
safety, conduct where legal enforcement action is required by law, repeated noncompli-
ance, the provision of inaccurate data to the FAA, actions pertaining to competency or
qualification, and law enforcement-related activities.”).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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agency dubs “petitions for modification.”138  Indeed, the Agency has an
entire handbook, publicly accessible, that details how the Agency processes
such requests.139  A mine must formally request a modification, at which
point the Agency posts the request in the Federal Register.140  Interested par-
ties thereafter can file comments.141  Ordinarily, not many comments are
filed, but the Agency observed during the interview that union representa-
tives frequently file comments.  The Agency then conducts a field investiga-
tion, which examines the facts but does not make a recommendation.142
Higher-level officials thereafter examine the request, any comments, and the
field report to make a decision called a Proposed Decision and Order.143
That decision can be appealed to an administrative law judge, whose decision
in turn can be appealed to the Agency’s assistant secretary.144  Following
that, it is possible to seek review in district court, but that is very rare.
By statute, mines must raise one of two arguments in support of a modi-
fication to a safety standard.145  First, that the mine will engage in another
practice that is at least as safe as what the regulation hopes to achieve.146  Or
second, that if the regulation is followed as written, it will result in a diminu-
tion of safety, at least for the specific location.147  The MSHA will not grant a
modification if the result would be a less safe working environment for min-
ers.  For example, MSHA regulations require that coal mines maintain a 300-
feet diameter around oil and gas wells.148  (Coal mining could cause sparks,
which would be very dangerous around a gas or oil well.)  If a mine wants to
move closer to the well, it can request a modification.  The MSHA will then
consider granting such a modification if the mine can show that the proposal
is as safe as the standard.149  Outside of coal, a typical situation involves use
of pressurized air to dust off miners.  Ordinarily, that is not permitted, but
when an outside company constructed a safe machine to do it, the Agency
began readily authorizing such modifications.150  The process, on average,
takes approximately nine months, but there are means for expedited consid-
138 See MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PETITIONS FOR MODIFICA-
TION: COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH AND METAL AND NONMETAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
(2008).
139 See id.
140 Id. at 6.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 26.
143 See id.
144 See 30 C.F.R. § 44.35 (2017).
145 See 30 U.S.C. § 811(c) (2012).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 30 C.F.R. § 75.1700.
149 See id. § 44.16(e).
150 See, e.g., Affirmative Decisions on Petitions for Modification Granted in Whole or in
Part, 81 Fed. Reg. 8996, 8996–97 (Feb. 23, 2016).
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eration.151  Once granted, the permission is generally permanent; modifica-
tions usually do not have time restrictions.  After all, often a modification
requires a physical change to the mine.  A temporary modification makes
little sense for a physical change to the mine itself.
According to the Agency, it received sixty-four petitions for modification
in 2014, and granted twenty-three of them “at least to some extent.”152  Yet
that does not mean that all of the other petitions were denied.  Sometimes
requests for nonenforcement are withdrawn because the mine can find
another way to accomplish its goal.  Similarly, MSHA officials made an inter-
esting observation during the interview.  They explained that one reason that
there are few requests for modifications of standards is that the mining indus-
try is an established one; technological changes occur sometimes, but often
not especially quickly.  Thus, mines may not need regulatory modifications
all that often.  Likewise, the Agency’s substantive standards themselves are
often performance based (i.e., they are based on outcomes, not necessarily
specific means).  This may also reduce the need for nonenforcement.
The MSHA stressed that it does not engage in prosecutorial discretion—
inspectors must cite violations.  That said, the Agency recognizes that
infeasibility can be a defense and may delay enforcement in narrow instances
to allow an industry or an operator to come into compliance.  For instance,
soon after a new standard is promulgated, the Agency may not require imme-
diate implementation so long as the regulated mine is making a good-faith
effort to comply.  This sort of analysis is generally mine-specific.  Sometimes,
moreover, the Agency uses infeasibility in a categorical way.  One example
involved self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs), which are devices that provide
breathable air to miners during emergencies.  During the interview, an
instance was recounted in which the Agency required a certain type of SCSR
for coal miners, but the SCSRs, although ordered, were not arriving in time
for mines to comply with the new standard.  The Agency accordingly
informed mines across the board that they would not be cited as long as they
could show that they had ordered the required SCSRs.
4. The TTB
The final case study is the TTB.  The TTB is an interesting agency; it
operates both as a taxing agency and as a consumer protection agency.
Housed within the Treasury Department, it is tasked with “enforcing the pro-
visions of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act . . . to ensure that only
qualified persons engage in the alcohol beverage industry” by regulating
alcohol and tobacco production, with a focus on taxation but also on product
labeling.153
151 30 C.F.R. § 44.13(a); see also MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 138, at
17–18.
152 MSHA Survey Response, supra note 69.
153 TTB’s Mission—What We Do, ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND TRADE BUREAU,
https://ttb.gov/consumer/responsibilities.shtml (last updated Feb. 14, 2018); see, e.g.,
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In some respects, the TTB is closer to the MSHA than it is to the FAA.
Like the MSHA, the amount of nonenforcement is fairly limited; whereas the
FAA may consider hundreds or even thousands of requests in a single year,
the TTB will often receive less than fifty.  In other respects, however, the TTB
is similar to both the FAA and the MSHA.  It also requires an application
before it engages in nonenforcement and it does not grant all requests, deny-
ing approximately fifteen percent of them.
In many ways, however, the TTB is different from both the FAA and the
MSHA.  Most obviously, whereas the MSHA and the FAA make nonenforce-
ment decisions public, including through use of notice-and-comment proce-
dures, the TTB typically does not place information about its
nonenforcement decisions in the Federal Register or otherwise make them
available.154  The primary reason for this, according to the Agency, is that
confidentiality is especially important when it comes to taxes.  Thus, the
Agency is reluctant to share too much information.  That said, the Agency
emphasized that if there is an issue of widespread applicability, it is willing to
issue guidance documents to the regulated community.155  But the process
under the TTB is different because, as a rule, it is not public.
The TTB has specific statutory grants to engage in nonenforcement; it
also does so through what it calls “Alternate Methods or Procedures,” which
allow nonenforcement where the regulated party can demonstrate that
another method will work just as well.156  The Agency typically pursues
known violations, thus exercising prosecutorial discretion somewhat rarely.
Typically, this occurs at the investigator level.  Judicial review of any aspect of
the Agency’s nonenforcement is very unusual.
In the TTB’s experience, it is more often the larger manufacturers that
seek prospective nonenforcement.  One potential explanation is that smaller
players do not need exceptions as often.  Lack of knowledge is possible, but,
given the many contacts between the Agency and those it regulates (e.g.,
licenses and inspections), this explanation may be unlikely.
TTB Approves General-Use Formulas for Certain Agricultural Wines, TTB Ruling No.
2016–2 (Sept. 29, 2016) (“As part of its ongoing efforts to reduce for industry members the
regulatory burdens associated with formula approval and to increase administrative effi-
ciencies for the Bureau, consistent with its mission to protect the public and collect the
revenue, TTB has reviewed the formula requirements for certain agricultural wines to
determine where its formula review process could be streamlined and modernized.  As a
result of this review, TTB has determined that its formula review process for certain stan-
dard agricultural wine products can be accomplished in a more efficient manner while still
being consistent with TTB’s mission.”); Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, Alco-
hol and Tobacco Export Documentation Procedures (Industry Circular No. 2004–3, Aug.
31, 2004) (“We are issuing this circular to announce an alternative procedure to allow you
to request approval to retain export documentation at your premises.”).
154 TTB Survey Response, supra note 66.
155 See, e.g., Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, Pinot Noir from the Langue-
doc-Roussillon Region of France; Cancellation of Declaration Requirement (Industry Cir-
cular No. 2017–3, May 18, 2017).
156 See, e.g., 27 C.F.R. §§ 19.26, 19.27 (2017).
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III. A TAXONOMY OF NONENFORCEMENT
Agency approaches to nonenforcement are heterogeneous.  This sug-
gests that the term “nonenforcement” is too broad.  Nonenforcement
includes a great many types of situations, some of which are more dangerous
than others.  Accordingly, in evaluating a particular nonenforcement deci-
sion, it is useful to explore the characteristics of that decision across numer-
ous factors.  It is not always clear whether one type of decision is more or less
susceptible to abuse than another.  But it is clear that different varieties
should not be clumped together.
A. Timing Factors
Obviously, one of the most important factors is whether an agency’s
exercise of its nonenforcement authority is prospective or retrospective—in
other words, has the regulated party violated the law yet or not?  If a violation
has already occurred, nonenforcement is an exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion; the agency could enforce the law but has chosen not to.  If the violation
has not occurred, nonenforcement is best understood as prospective authori-
zation; the agency is giving permission for a violation to occur by declaring,
in a sense, that the prohibition does not apply.  This sort of timing distinction
is common in law.157  Of course, it is possible for one regulated entity to seek
both prospective authorization and retrospective forgiveness, for instance, if
it has violated the law and wishes to continue doing so.  But it is analytically
useful to draw a distinction.
B. Nontiming Factors
Various nontiming, situational factors are important.158  Although this
list is not meant to be comprehensive, at least ten should be considered.
Many of these factors are presented as binary when, in fact, a spectrum is
more accurate.  A binary framework, however, is easier to conceptualize.
1. Who Makes the Decision?
It matters who makes the decision.  Specifically, is the decision left to
staff or must it be made by a political appointee?  And, if a political appointee
is involved, is involvement meaningful or pro forma?  Likewise, are individu-
als outside of the agency involved in the process?  Why the “who” question
matters is obvious: career staff and political appointees may have different
characteristics.  To the extent that we worry about the politicization of non-
enforcement, one might prefer staff to make these decisions.  At the same
157 See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975) (“Having violated the
ordinance . . . M & L cannot now be heard to complain that its constitutional contentions
are being resolved in a state court.”).
158 Other potential factors include the reasons for the violation, the consequences of
nonenforcement, the ease of identifying whether a violation has occurred, and agency
design (e.g., whether enforcement is handled by a separate office).
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time, however, for accountability reasons, there is a good argument that
political appointees should be involved.  That principle may extend to
involvement of a political outsider of the agency.  For purposes here, it is
enough to recognize that how one thinks about nonenforcement may vary
depending on who makes the decision.
2. The Nature of the Agency Judgment
Another important factor addresses the nature of the agency judgment:
Is it “policy driven” or “technical”?159  The line between “policy driven” and
“technical” decisions is no doubt a fuzzy one, but it is also a line recognized
in the literature.  Determining whether a law should apply in a certain situa-
tion cannot entirely be divorced from politics.  But one’s sense of the riski-
ness of nonenforcement might change, for instance, when it looks like the
agency is acting for political reasons—especially political reasons that may
not reflect the statutory directive of the Congress that enacted the relevant
law.
3. The Source of the Legal Duty
Likewise, it is also important to consider the source of the legal duty.
Was it created by Congress in a statute or by the agency in a regulation?160
Of course, agencies need congressional authority to act, so, in a sense, all
regulations are created by Congress.  Even so, a regulation is not a statute,
and the agency often has more authority to define the scope of a regulation.
One might think that decisions to not enforce congressional commands are
more serious because they threaten Congress’s ability to create policy.  On
the other hand, decisions not to enforce regulations may be more serious
because of the incentives they create for agencies; agencies may, for instance,
intentionally promulgate a broad rule knowing that they can use nonenforce-
ment when they choose.
4. The Instigation of Nonenforcement
It also is worth knowing whether the agency can act sua sponte or
whether a regulated party must ask.  Presumably, many instances of
prosecutorial discretion are sua sponte; regulated parties may be wary of vol-
untarily seeking nonenforcement for what has already happened because
doing so would require a confession.  Yet, some exercises of prospective non-
enforcement authority are also sua sponte.  Sua sponte nonenforcement
authority reflects greater discretion and suggests that the agency could more
easily use nonenforcement for political reasons.
159 See, e.g., Osofsky, supra note 13, at 112 (drawing this distinction).
160 Cf. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 6, at 267.
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5. The Clarity of the Criteria
The criteria an agency uses to evaluate nonenforcement are also impor-
tant.  In particular, it matters how specific the criteria are, because the more
open-ended the standard, the more discretion the agency has.  This point
was made by the D.C. Circuit in NetworkIP.161  If an agency can decide to
waive regulatory requirements whenever doing so is in the “public interest,”
it has a great deal of discretion.  Because discretion can be abused, open-
ended criteria are especially problematic since they may enhance an agency’s
ability to engage in biased decisionmaking.
6. The Breadth Across Entities
It is also worth knowing how many regulated parties the agency’s nonen-
forcement decision applies to.  Does it apply to just one entity, a handful, or
an entire industry?  It is not clear whether broad or narrow nonenforcement
is more dangerous.  When nonenforcement is narrow, presumably there is
more compliance with the law overall.  But if we are worried about bias,
broader nonenforcement may be preferable.  In any event, the scope of non-
enforcement should influence our assessment of it.
7. The Breadth for a Single Entity
Similarly, we should want to know how much nonenforcement is occur-
ring for a single entity.  Has the agency determined not to enforce all parts of
the law or only certain parts of the law?  Relatedly, the agency may decide to
waive requirements for one party in an adjudication but not another, thus
potentially determining who will win. NetworkIP again is a good example of
this.  There, the Agency waived a procedural rule for one party but did not
waive the related substantive requirements for the other side.162
8. Public Disclosure
“Old-fashioned publicity is another significant check on agency
action.”163  Hence, it is significant whether the agency’s decision is publicly
available.  Disclosure, moreover, extends beyond just the final decision.  Does
the agency acknowledge its nonenforcement authority and publish the pro-
cedures it uses?  Does it allow interested parties to comment on requests for
nondisclosure?  Does it provide enough information about its nondisclosure
decision that its analysis can be subjected to public scrutiny?  In evaluating
nonenforcement, all of these questions matter.
161 See NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
162 See id. at 126.
163 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Non-Judicial Checks on Agency Actions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 193,
195 (1997). But see Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 902–03
(2006) (setting forth some of “transparency’s limits”).
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9. Benefit to Agency
Whether the agency benefits (and if so, how?) from nonenforcement is
also relevant.  Must the regulated party do something in exchange for a
waiver, and if so, what?  Such benefits may bias agency decisionmaking.  This
factor relates to the clarity of the agency’s criteria, as well as to the source of
the legal duty.  The clearer the standard, the less likely it is that the agency
can engage in “horsetrading.”  Likewise, to the extent that the agency wishes
to engage in “horsetrading,” it may draft overly broad prohibitions to create
the leverage it needs to do so.
10. Whether There Is Judicial Review
Finally, the availability of judicial review also matters.  One of the pur-
poses of judicial review is to prevent arbitrary or biased decisions, and to the
extent that agencies know that their decisions will be reviewed, they have
incentives to be careful from the beginning.164  There are costs and benefits
to judicial review, of course.  Thus, recognizing that judicial review may pre-
vent bad acts by agencies does not necessarily mean that judicial review is
always worthwhile.  But the prospect of judicial review should factor into
one’s appraisal of nonenforcement.
C. Visual Taxonomy
It is possible to evaluate a nonenforcement decision across all of these
factors.
164 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 529.
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Taxonomy of Nonenforcement 
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IV. A BETTER APPROACH?
Nonenforcement is valuable but dangerous.  There are times when it is
not possible to enforce the law against all violations, and there are also times
when it would not be desirable to do so even it could be done.  Hence the
value of discretion.  Yet this form of discretion, like others, can be used in
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problematic ways.  This is especially true in the context of nonenforcement
of agency-created regulatory duties, because awareness that nonenforcement
is available may create bad incentives for agencies when they design rules
from the outset.  After all, perhaps agencies will be less precise when drafting
regulations if they know that they can always just grant a waiver.  How then to
strike the balance?
There are several obvious safeguards.  Unless there is a very good reason
not to, for instance, agencies should publicize their nonenforcement pro-
grams and policies, as well as their nonenforcement decisions.  They can also
encourage public comments, especially from those most likely to be
affected.165  To the extent that these sorts of commonsense safeguards are
not already being used, agencies should rethink their practices, or, if need
be, Congress should consider legislation.  While important, however, these
mechanisms do not always get at the heart of the problem.  The truth is that
nonenforcement should be the exception, not the rule, and discretion to
exercise nonenforcement authority should be used carefully.
Why should nonenforcement be the exception? Because it is dangerous.
For instance, unless there is a compelling justification for requiring ex ante
approval,166 in a free society, one should be able to look at the relevant legal
texts and, if one’s conduct comports with that law, act with confidence.167  By
the same token, if there are certain types of conduct that the lawmaker (be it
Congress or an agency) has concluded are not problematic, regulated parties
should not have to ask permission before engaging in that conduct.  Even
apart from the affront to liberty, it is costly to force regulated parties (i) to
figure out in the first instance whether their intended conduct comports with
165 See, e.g., EBSA Survey Response, supra note 65 (“Applicants must disclose, under
penalty of perjury, all relevant factual information that may be used by EBSA to make its
findings whether to grant an exemption.  EBSA will only grant an exemption based on a
fully developed record that is open to the public.  Before granting an exemption, EBSA
must publish a proposed exemption on the Federal Register and give interested persons the
ability to comment and request a hearing.  Only after considering commenters’ input may
EBSA then grant an exemption.” (emphasis added)).
166 For instance, if conduct is particularly dangerous (e.g., generating nuclear power),
it may make sense to prohibit such conduct unless the regulated party can demonstrate
special competence.  In other words, sometimes it makes sense to create broad prohibi-
tions but then to have exceptions (i.e., a permit system). See generally Eric Biber & J.B.
Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administra-
tive State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133 (2014) (recognizing value of permits).
167 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Essay, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 407, 407 (1995) (“One’s attitude toward the permit power is heavily influenced by
one’s attitude toward individual liberty more generally.  An old observation of the German
system of freedom is that all which is not permitted is prohibited (which is at least better
than what I take sometimes to be the modern American position that all which is not
prohibited is required).  The classical American view generally took the form that all that is
not prohibited is permitted, which sets the initial presumption in favor of liberty—not in
favor of government action.”); cf. Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 543
(2009) (“When people are confident that they are aware of the applicable laws, they will be
more confident taking the business risks that drive our economy.”).
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the law and (ii) if not, to figure out how to prompt nonenforcement by the
agency.  To be sure, it is not costless for the lawmaker to anticipate activities
that are not problematic and write legal prohibitions that do not capture
such activities, especially if some unobjectionable activities are idiosyncratic;
bounded rationality applies to lawmakers, too.168  But, if many regulated par-
ties whose conduct is not objectionable are being affected by the prohibition,
often something has gone wrong, even if the agency routinely grants waivers.
The law on the ground should reflect the law on the books.  This is especially
true because not everyone is legally sophisticated.  It is almost certainly easier
for big, established companies, for instance, to navigate the world of waiver
than it is for small, upstart competitors.  And, the less discretion there is, the
fewer opportunities there are that discretion will be abused.169  Thus,
although there is a place for nonenforcement in administrative law, it should
be a small place.
The D.C. Circuit’s analysis in NetworkIP bears close attention because it is
sensitive to these concerns.  The court explained that an agency must be able
to “articulate the nature of the special circumstances to prevent discrimina-
tory application and to put future parties on notice as to its operation.”170
And the reason the D.C. Circuit did this was because it wanted to prevent
nonenforcement from becoming too common.  Related to the idea that non-
enforcement should be the exception rather than the rule is the notion that
the agency should be able to explain why a particular situation is unusual,
preferably with objective criteria.  If the agency cannot do so, there is a dan-
ger that it is behaving in an arbitrary manner.
The realization that nonenforcement should be the exception rather
than the rule has significant implications.  If a lawmaker (either Congress or
an agency) knows that a large category of conduct is unobjectionable, any
prohibition it creates should not capture that conduct.  Sometimes, however,
the lawmaker does not know that such a category of unobjectionable conduct
exists when it enacts a legal prohibition, perhaps because the category does
not yet exist at the time but only later comes into existence.  The result might
be that the agency finds itself granting many requests for nonenforcement.
When that happens, nonenforcement may be useful as a temporary measure,
but the best response should be to change the prohibition.  In other words,
nonenforcement should not be seen as distinct from retrospective review.
Rather, a large number of requests for nonenforcement should be under-
stood, at least presumptively, as a trigger for retrospective review.
168 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1027, 1064 n.98 (1990).
169 See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation: Is Enforcement
Discretion the Answer?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1327, 1354 (2004) (“As the discretion afforded to
regulators increases, so does the potential for biased or inconsistent enforcement.  There is
considerable evidence showing that enforcement personnel exhibit systematic biases when
they make discretionary decisions.”).
170 NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Ne. Cellular
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Even apart from its implications for high-level constitutional theory,
nonenforcement raises important questions about how best to manage the
tradeoffs between the benefits of discretion and the dangers of its abuse.
This Article is intended as a step towards striking the right balance.
